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The American Republic was conceived in revolution. Many of the 
men who wrote the Constitution and administered the new political 
system had been leaders of the American Revolution; the citizens of the 
new Republic had fought in the war and absorbed its ideology. The 
Declaration of Independence, a document that Jefferson claimed was 
merely an "expression of the American mind," declared that it was the 
"Right of the people to alter or abolish" any government, and institute a 
new one that would better secure their safety and happiness. A proviso 
was indeed inserted declaring that the people would not, and should not, 
change their government for light and transient causes. The qualifica-
tion, however, was lightly passed over in the propaganda of the revo-
lution.1 
The founding fathers could not simply renounce the right of revolu-
tion, partly because they believed in it themselves, partly because the 
people believed in it, and partly because the legitimacy of the new coun-
try rested on this right. Yet the popular version of the Revolutionary 
theory could be very dangerous to a new government that none of the 
founding fathers wished to see destroyed. There were various solutions 
to this problem. Many ignored it. A few, like Hamilton, ultimately re-
nounced the idea that the people had the right to overthrow the central 
government. Madison did not renounce the theoretical right of revolu-
tion and indeed originally included it as one of the rights protected by 
the Bill of Rights. But Madison was also extremely fearful of revolution 
—even the amending process seemed risky to him—and he was unwilling 
to allow any practical applications for this theory. Jefferson, whose ideas 
we will examine in this article, was the least afraid of revolutionary ten-
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dencies. He sometimes threatened revolution and praised specific rebel-
lions, and always defended the theoretical right of revolution. On the 
other hand Jefferson was not willing to see the constitutional system de-
stroyed. It was from this tension that an important part of Jefferson's 
political theory and rhetoric developed, and Jefferson was consistent in 
maintaining this tension throughout his life. 
Revolution was a subtle instrument in Jefferson's hands. He never 
renounced the right of revolution and at various times in his life appears 
to have contemplated revolution. He wrote the Kentucky Resolutions 
with their doctrine of nullification and implied threat of secession. He 
linked his election in 1800 to the right of revolution (see footnote 10 
below) and believed the Federalist attempt to block his election by the 
House, and pass a law allowing the Senate to select a temporary President 
was both illegal and anti-revolutionary.2 Jefferson countered the Fed-
eralist plan with a threat to invoke the right of revolution, arguing that, 
. . . we thought it best to declare openly and firmly, one 
and all, that the day such an act passed, the middle states 
would arm, and that no such usurpation, even for a single 
day should be submitted to . . . they were completely 
alarmed at a recourse for which we declared, to wit, a con-
vention to reorganize the government, and to amend it.8 
Jefferson did not reject the possibility of revolution after his presi-
dency (though he did assume an anti-revolutionary stance during his term 
of office). Even in 1825 revolution seems to have remained a viable alter-
native for Jefferson. In reacting to the national government's encroach-
ment on state power Jefferson rejected revolution, but as always his 
rejection was not flippant and indicated a sincere weighing of the revo-
lutionary arguments: 
. . . And what is our resource for the preservation of the 
Constitution? Reason and Argument? you might as well 
reason and argue with the marble columns encircling them. 
The representatives chosen by ourselves? They are joined 
in the combination. . . . Are we then to stand to our arms, 
with the hot headed Georgian? No. That must be the last 
resource, not to be thought of until much longer and greater 
sufferings. If every infraction of a compact of so many 
parties is to be resisted at once, none can ever be found 
which would last one year. We must have patience . . . and 
separate from our companions only when the sole alterna-
tives left are the dissolution of our Union with them, or 
submission to a government without limitation of powers. 
Between these two evils, when we must make a choice, there 
can be no hesitation.4 
Even more important than Jefferson's specific revolutionary proposals 
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is the revolutionary tenor of his thought. He is remembered for his 
revolutionary questions (Whether one generation of men has the right 
to bind another . . .) and statements ("The tree of liberty must be re-
freshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants." "If the 
happiness of the mass of the people can be secured at the expense of a 
little tempest now and then, or even of a little blood, it will be a precious 
purchase.")5 Jefferson was an ardent supporter of the French Revolution. 
He did not withdraw his support after the Terror or after his Presidency. 
In 1825 he wrote Adams that if Europe was to attain freedom, "rivers of 
blood must yet flow, and years of desolation pass over." The object, he 
continued, "is worth rivers of blood and years of desolation. For what 
inheritance so valuable, can man leave to his posterity?"6 
Jefferson never renounced the radical Natural Rights philosophy 
enunciated in the Declaration of Independence. The people delegate 
power to their representatives only because of "the inconvenience of 
meeting to exercise these powers in person, and their general inaptitude 
to exercise them." But the nation retains the right of revolution; it is the 
people's will "which creates or annihilates the organ which is to declare 
and announce it."7 
II 
Jefferson seems, however, to contradict his own revolutionary rhetoric. 
The same man who asserted that it could be proved "that no society can 
make a perpetual constitution" argued for a permanent union and a 
permanent Bill of Rights, since he thought the political morals of the 
people would decay and it was necessary to fix them at the beginning.8 
Despite his numerous revolutionary assertions and threats he never 
actually led a revolution against the federal government, worked very 
hard to avoid secession by the New England States,9 and almost always 
qualified his revolutionary statements with the proviso that real revolu-
tion was not now necessary. Jefferson often talked of revolution, but in 
practice he preferred the use of a number of alternatives to revolution, 
such as elections, the amending process, threats of revolution, and partial 
rebellion.10 
Like John Locke, Jefferson placed a high value on the threat of revo-
lution, and thought this threat a safe way to realize the goals of real 
revolution.11 In 1788 he wrote Adams that he hoped France's internal 
affairs would be settled without blood. "None has been shed yet. The 
nation presses sufficiently upon the government to force reformations, 
without forcing them to draw the sword. If they can keep the opposition 
always exactly at this point, all will end well."12 "Under governments 
wherein the will of everyone has a just influence," Jefferson had earlier 
written Madison, 
. . . the mass of mankind . . . enjoys a precious degree of 
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liberty and happiness. It has its evils too: the principal of 
which is the turbulence to which it is subject. . . . Even this 
evil is productive of good. It prevents the degeneracy of 
government, and nourishes a general attention to the public 
affairs. . . . Unsuccessful rebellions indeed generally estab-
lish the encroachments on the rights of the people who have 
produced them. [Rebellion] is a medicine necessary for the 
sound health of government.13 
It was this theoretical position that Jefferson retained for the re-
mainder of his life. The right of, revolution was seen as a necessary de-
fense of freedom. But real revolution could lead to just the type of 
despotism that Jefferson was struggling to avoid. Threats of revolution, 
combined with "unsuccessful rebellions" (even if these were unwise like 
Shays' Rebellion and the later Whiskey Rebellion) would secure the bene-
fits of revolution without increasing their dangers. Both forced the society 
to deal with problems before they assumed proportions that would justify 
real revolution. Both acted as alternatives to real revolution, performed 
the functions that American theory ascribed to real revolution and were 
consistent with the style of a society founded by revolution. Afraid of the 
destruction of the Constitutional system, Jefferson emphasized the politi-
cal role of unsuccessful rebellion and of the threat of revolution. These, 
he felt, did much good and little evil. 
I l l 
Jefferson thought of rebellion as an element in forcing a moral deci-
sion rather than as a weapon designed to conquer. Rebellion had a jurid-
ical role, and the rebels were, in effect, presenting their case to the re-
mainder of the society which Jefferson envisioned as a vast Court. Like 
Madison, Jefferson felt that the variety of groups and the large area of the 
country provided assurance that most people in the national arena would 
not be affected by local conflicts and prejudices. 
. . . Perhaps it will be found, that to obtain a just repub-
lic . . . it must be so extensive as that local egoisms may 
never reach its greater part; that on every particular ques-
tion, a majority may be found in its councils free from par-
ticular interests, and giving, therefore, an uniform preva-
lence to the principles of justice.14 
Just as the affections of the people of the world, if unaffected by a 
particular conflict, "will ever take part with those encountering oppres-
sions" so the unbiased majority in the United States would sympathize 
with those suffering oppression—at least Jefferson thought they should 
sympathize. But since men usually have some interest in preserving an 
existent immorality, Jefferson did not expect a perfect moral response. 
All men, Jefferson thought, had a 'Moral Sense' that was a valid judge 
of right and wrong. The contents of this sense were cultural: different 
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societies had different conceptions of those things which were right. But 
in all societies the essence of virtue lay in 'doing good to others/ and all 
members of all societies tried to be virtuous, even though the acts deemed 
virtuous might vary due to differing circumstances and beliefs.15 
Fair-minded people—unbiased people with a moral sense—would pay 
attention to verbal claims of oppression. But because people were usually 
not completely unbiased, or simply because of inertia, a verbal moral 
claim was often ignored. The 'moral sense,' Jefferson thought, would 
usually need some prodding. 
One way of heightening a moral problem, and forcing the people to 
take notice of it, was by rebellion. Rebellion was the forceful presenta-
tion of a case—people rebelled because they thought they were being 
denied important rights. By disobeying the law—by illegally attempting 
to change the conditions of legality—the rebels were placing themselves 
in a state of war with the rest of society. They could either be defeated 
and punished or allowed to achieve victory, but they could not be ig-
nored; there could be no refusal to decide. If a society already half-
suspected the Tightness of the law, or if the laws ran counter to the 
expressed and felt moral demands of the society, forcing a moral decision 
should benefit the lawbreakers. 
Jefferson thought in terms of two levels of revolt: populist rebellions 
(e.g., Shays) and elitist threats of rebellion (e.g., the Virginia and Ken-
tucky Resolutions). Either type of rebellion could be right or wrong; the 
rebels could be either correct or incorrect in their belief that they were 
being discriminated against and denied their natural liberties. If the 
participants in a populist rebellion were wrong in this belief, the way to 
end the rebellion was to educate and inform them of the facts. This done, 
the rebellion, like the Whiskey Rebellion and Shays' Rebellion, would 
quietly end.16 No real harm would come from this type of rebellion, and 
since it would remind the government that the people retained their 
right of revolution—thus serving as a check upon future despotism—and 
was a necessary symptom of democratic man, Jefferson thought they 
would be productive of some good. 
But if the participants in a populist rebellion were right, the rebel-
lions would never cease and could not be repressed. The rebels would act 
because human values, as defined by their own society, were not granted 
to them. As men became aware of the moral, or natural, law they would 
demand their rights under that law. The more they learned, the more 
they would rebel. Thus democratic revolutions—of some sort—were in-
evitable in the Western World. And slaves, in a society that declared all 
men were created equal, would rebel—as they became aware of the moral 
values of the society, and to the extent that they regarded themselves as 
men. The ambivalent moral position of those who had no interest in 
owning slaves would make them unwilling to fight to retain the institu-
tion; the inconveniences caused by constantly recurring rebellions and 
65 
the ever present threat of rebellion, would make them glad to destroy it. 
In America rebellion would thus accomplish what only real revolutions 
could do in other, more closed societies. 
American values, Jefferson noted, were stated so they applied to all 
men as men. As such they had to apply to every man in America; as he 
came to understand these values, every man would apply them to himself. 
As early as 1786, Jefferson obliquely declared that either Americans would 
grant slaves their human rights, or, when the slaves understood the extent 
of their deprivation, they would rebel. The passage, inserted in his 
Encyclopedia Article is rhetorical, overblown, and worthy of John Locke 
in its vagueness. 
. . . What a stupendous, what an incomprehensible machine 
is man! Who can endure toil, famine, strifes, imprisonment 
or death itself in vindication of his own liberty, and the 
next moment be deaf to all those motives whose power sup-
ported him thro' his trial, and inflict on his fellow man a 
bondage, one hour of which is fraught with more misery 
than ages of that which he rose in rebellion to oppose. But 
we must await with patience the workings of an overruling 
providence, and hope that it is preparing the deliverance of 
these our suffering brethren. When the measure of their 
tears shall be full, when their groans shall have involved 
heaven itself in darkness, doubtless a god of justice will 
awaken to their distress, and by diffusing light and liberality 
among their oppressors, or at length by his exterminating 
thunder, manifest his attention to those things of this world, 
and that they are not left to the guidance of a blind 
fatality.17 
A much more specific statement of the theory of righteous rebellion 
was made almost twenty years later. Jefferson argued that slave rebellions 
would not stop; the slaves, convinced their rebellion was justified, would 
not lie quiescent. Unlike the participants in wrong rebellions, the slaves 
could not be quieted by education and information. They would "rise 
more formidable after every defeat." Those who did not have an interest 
in slavery would either perceive the moral issues involved or perceive the 
inconvenience of slavery; those whose interests were involved would find 
that the burden of slaves outweighed their benefit. The burden of forcing 
the moral decision rested on the slaves—those deprived of their rights. 
They had to rebel to start the process. The pure good will of the majority 
could not be relied upon. l s Since slaves were a weak minority they could 
not hope to win by force; their violence was to be a form of moral persua-
sion. The society would not be able to ignore the slave rebellions—the 
slaves would have to be either repressed or freed. The flaw in Jefferson's 
analysis is that he did not foresee the strengthening of the interests in-
volved. He argued that 
. . . There are many virtuous men who would make any sac-
rifice to effect it [the freeing of the slaves], many equally 
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virtuous men who persuade themselves either that the thing 
is not wrong, or that it cannot be remedied, and very many 
with whom interest is morality. The older we grow the 
larger we are disposed to believe the last party to be. But 
interest is really going over to the side of morality. The 
value of the slave is everyday lessening; his burden on his 
master daily increasing. Interest is therefore preparing the 
disposition to be just; and this will be goaded from time to 
time by the insurrectionary spirit of the slaves. This is easily 
quelled in its first efforts; but from being local it will be-
come more general, and whenever it does it will rise more 
formidible after every defeat. . . .19 
IV 
Jefferson believed that populist rebellions either in Europe or Amer-
ica could, under certain conditions, be both useful and justified. He did 
feel that the Americans were better qualified than the "canaille" of 
Europe who were "habituated from their infancy to passive submission of 
body and mind to their kings and priests." The Europeans, he argued in 
1823, "are not qualified when called on to think and provide for them-
selves; and their inexperience, their ignorance and bigotry make them 
instruments often, in the hands of Bonapartes and Iturbides, to defeat 
their own rights and purposes."20 Ten years earlier he had written to 
Adams that the masses of Europe had thwarted the European revolution 
of "science, talents, and courage, against rank and birth." "The mobs of 
the cities," explained Jefferson, though "the instrument used for its ac-
complishment, debased by ignorance, poverty and vice, could not be 
restrained to rational action."21 
Even though the Americans were more peaceful and better qualified 
to rule than the European mobs, Jefferson was reticent about mass rebel-
lions and in general did not think that the masses—the mob—should 
attempt to revolt on their own. In action, the arm of the people was a 
machine, "not quite so blind as balls and bombs, but blind to a certain 
degree."22 Like Shays' Rebellion, mass rebellions were usually led by men 
whose information was wrong or incomplete, and who misunderstood 
public affairs. Popular groups were isolated, and lacked both the wisdom 
and the coordination needed to successfully influence the nation. Finally, 
there remained the problem that the people, if they ever captured power, 
would be as tyrannical as any despot. 
Throughout his life Jefferson preferred the pattern that had been 
followed during the American Revolution. The society had been led not 
by populist leaders but by the lesser magistrates of the realm—the leaders 
of the colonial governments. The people, he thought, functioned best as 
a control rather than as an active force; they were better qualified to 
judge the relative merits of different propositions placed before them 
than they were to formulate proposals themselves. If properly educated, 
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the people would be the "true corrective o£ abuses of constitutional 
power";23 they were to judge rather than initiate. 
As is clear from his educational plans, Jefferson believed in leadership 
by an elite—as Gilbert Chinard stated, Jefferson's ideal government would 
have been "a government of the best minds selected by a populace suffi-
ciently enlightened to select the best minds. . . ."24 Ideally, Jeffersonian 
revolts probably would have been led by the natural aristocrats. Since as 
a practical matter it was difficult to identify isolated natural aristocrats, 
Jefferson was willing to exploit an ambiguity inherent in the federal 
structure and use the states to initiate elitist revolts. State action against 
the federal government could be justified either by consitutional theory— 
as were the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions—or by direct appeal to the 
right of revolution.25 As with populist revolts, State action could be right 
or wrong—this was to be judged by the people. 
Unlike populist revolts, state action had to remain merely verbal and 
threatening. A real rebellion by a political unit as powerful as a State 
would have destroyed—or at least seriously endangered—the constitutional 
system far more than an isolated rebellion by a relatively weak and dis-
organized group of people. On the other hand the states were powerful' 
enough so that a threat of revolution by them would be as effective in 
raising an issue as a real rebellion by a weaker group. 
Although Jefferson contemplated state action many times, the most 
obvious and important example of a Jeffersonian State revolt remains the 
Kentucky Resolutions. Some writers feel that Jefferson, as a last resort, 
was willing to lead a true revolution and destroy the Union rather than 
see the liberties guaranteed by the first amendment destroyed.20 It seems 
clear, though, that the Kentucky Resolutions were not a part of such an 
attempt, nor did Jefferson seriously consider destroying the Union at any 
time of his life.27 Rather, as Ethelbert Warfield notes, the Kentucky 
Resolutions were "in the nature of a political manifesto, and as such 
incurred a danger which frequently attacks such fulminations." The reso-
lutions, Warfield argues, "did not contemplate immediate action, and so 
wanted that restraint which the very nature of the case imposed upon all 
declarations which are intended to be acted upon at once, or to become a 
rule of conduct."28 
The Kentucky Resolutions were primarily a presentation of the Re-
publican case to the court of the people. Just as with populist rebellions, 
the attempt was not to defeat the adversary on the field of battle, but to 
convert the unbiased populace. Real revolution would have been self-
defeating. 
A wonderful and rapid change has taken place in Pennsyl-
vania, Jersey and New York. Congress is daily plied with 
petitions against the Alien and Sedition laws and standing 
armies. Several parts of this state (Pennsylvania) are so vio-
lent that we fear an insurrection. This will be brought 
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about by some if they can. It is the only thing that we have 
to fear. The appearance of an attack of force against the 
government would check the present current of the Middle 
States, and rally them around the government; whereas, if 
suffered to go on, it will pass on to a reformation of abuses.29 
Jefferson feared that if strong protest was not made against the Alien 
and Sedition laws, further unconstitutional acts would be promulgated 
by the Federalists. The laws were "merely an experiment on the Ameri-
can mind, to see how far it will bear an avowed violation of the constitu-
tion." Unfortunately, the people had "shown themselves susceptible" to 
"dupery" and had to be awakened.30 Years later Jefferson, presumably 
still conscious of the Kentucky Resolutions, wrote that the "true barriers 
of our liberty in this country are the State governments," since they pre-
vent any one passion, or the influence of any one man, from controlling 
the whole country at once, and they provided an organized center for 
opposition to despotism. The danger that might "reasonably be appre-
hended from this perfect and distinct organization" of the states was that 
certain states might attempt to secede from the union. But, Jefferson 
argued, this was impossible. Either the states would not have the power 
to secede because they represented an impotent minority, or they would 
not need to secede because they could control the majority and thus con-
trol the government. 
. . . it is not probable that local discontents can spread to 
such an extent, as to be able to face the sound parts of so 
extensive a Union; and if ever they should reach the ma-
jority, they would then become the regular government, 
acquire the ascendency in Congress, and be able to redress 
their own grievances by laws peacably and constitutionally 
passed. And even the States in which local discontents might 
engender a commencement of fermentation, would be para-
lyzed and self-checked by that very division into parties into 
which we have fallen . . .31 
It is difficult to believe that at the time of the Kentucky Resolutions 
Jefferson would have settled for the destruction of the union when what 
he wanted to do was control it. Furthermore, as was noted earlier, Jeffer-
son believed that democracy needed the large expanse of America if it was 
to work effectively. Secession, or the destruction of the constitutional sys-
tem, would therefore be self-defeating. 
The Kentucky Resolutions, the justification of Shays' Rebellion, the 
enunciation of revolutionary doctrines and the warnings of future slave 
rebellions were all a part of the same pattern. Both the elitist threats of 
revolution and the isolated "unsuccessful rebellions" of populist groups 
were an appeal to the sense of the majority; they were all an attempt to 
win an "election"—a majority vindication. The complete victory of a 
revolutionary group—except by the process of convincing the majority-
would be despotic. Secession would be self-defeating. The tension be-
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tween order and revolution had to be maintained; safe maintenance of 
the tension required the large area and the geographical diversity of the 
United States. 
The argument can be made that Jefferson seems at times to go beyond 
this tension and advocate real revolution; it is certainly improbable that 
he was completely aware that he advocated only a domesticated form of 
revolution. Undoubtedly Jefferson was sincere when he claimed that the 
society retained its right of revolution. But he was equally sincere in his 
fear of successful revolution and his feeling that—in America—they could 
only be useless and harmful. Thus, although he sometimes continued to 
talk in terms of real revolution, he actually used rebellion and the threat 
of revolution as a persuasive and cautionary technique. Jefferson in-
corporated civil disobedience into the constitutional structure. For the 
preservation of minority rights Jefferson relied far more on limited rebel-
lions than he did on the checks and balances of the constitutional system. 
Finally, one has to make a distinction between Jefferson the theoreti-
cian and Jefferson the politician. Jefferson thought honest rebels edu-
cated the rest of the country and could be educated themselves. But what 
of dishonest rebels—men who were rebelling for hidden reasons of per-
sonal aggrandizement, who were monarchists and agents of England, and 
who used public discussion as a means of corrupting the values of the 
people? Obviously those men could not be converted and would only 
present false issues to the country. This type of rebellion was dangerous 
and could only sap the democratic spirit of the nation. 
Jefferson, like the other leading political figures of his time, believed 
that his own motives were pure, and he suspected the motives of those 
who opposed him. The principles of partisan politics were not yet clearly 
formulated, and as a politician Jefferson was not willing to allow that a 
corrupt opposition could legitimately utilize political methods legitimate 
for other groups.32 This position raises problems for Jefferson the theo-
retician but Jefferson was never forced to confront them on other than a 
superficial level. 
Jefferson won most of the important political battles he engaged in, 
and he did not live long enough to face the actuality of widespread slave 
rebellions. Would he have participated in an actual revolt if the Repub-
licans had lost the election of 1800? Would he have supported real, as 
opposed to threatened, slave rebellions? Jefferson's position was never 
tested in this way, though I do not see how he could consistently deny 
the legitimacy of limited slave rebellions. By the terms of his own theory, 
though, Jefferson would not have to face up to ultimate revolutionary 
questions so long as the basic political morality of the American people 
retained its strength. Partial rebellions and threatened revolution would 
be enough under these circumstances, and the tension between revolution 
and legality could be maintained. 
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V 
In the Jeffersonian model certain types of rebellions are viewed as an 
intrinsic part of the constitutional system in that they, combined with the 
reactions against them and the debates they foster, force the polity to 
come to grips with the implications of the American political creed. The 
theory also seems to assume a distinction between 'good faith' rebellions 
—in which an ideological position is sincerely put forth and held, and in 
which the rebels themselves are somewhat open to change and education— 
and 'bad faith' rebellions in which the arguments advanced are viewed 
as mere covers for larger, covert operations and in which the agents 
perpetuating the rebellion are not open to the educative process. 
There is a serious problem of drawing the lines between the two types 
of rebellion, and of deciding which types are legitimate, and which types 
are forbidden. Categorical answers are not supplied by the Jeffersonian 
model. On the other hand, Jefferson's theory has obvious contemporary 
relevance, and it does present an extremely interesting approach to the 
legal system. The theory precludes simplistic arguments in which vio-
lence and talk of violence are always viewed as incompatible with democ-
racy, and supplies a way of reconciling the revolutionary and the legalistic-
constitutional aspects of the American political system. In Jefferson's 
model a country born in revolution was to be educated by rebels, who 
served themselves and the country when they raised questions and forced 
the majority to confront them. 
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